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The significance of the second refinement is that it seems to indicate
a willingness by the court to add the element of aggravated risk to its
previous formulation of gross negligence. The court's previous formulation, which was solely in terms of failure to exercise slight care,
ignored the idea that negligence is basically a matter of risk. 5 By
formulating gross negligence in terms of both aggravated risk and an
aggravated departure from ordinary care, the court should be able to
provide a clearer idea of the type of conduct it has in mind.
It would seem that the two elements of gross negligence, as thus
formulated, would operate on a sliding scale. As the gravity of the
risk increases, the amount of care demanded by ordinary prudence
also increases, thus accounting for the court's position that the defendant may be exercising more care than none and still fail to meet the
standard of slight care. Correlatively, as the gravity of the risk decreases, the amount of care demanded by ordinary prudence decreases,
and a more extreme departure from ordinary care should be required
before gross negligence may be found.
Although the court may never be able to escape the inherently nebulous qualities of gross negligence in formulating a definition, it should
be able to move closer to its goal of providing a workable means by
which trial court and jury may apply gross negligence to concrete
situations by formulating a definition in terms of aggravated risk as
well as aggravated departure from ordinary care.
PROPRIETY OF SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES TO
EXPLAIN INCONSISTENT VERDICTS IN
CONSOLIDATED ACTIONS
Two automobiles, approaching at right angles to each other, collided midway in an intersection controlled by a traffic signal. The
guest-passenger in Car One was fatally injured. The administratrix
of his estate (hereinafter referred to as plaintiff) brought a wrongful
death action against the driver of Car Two, alleging negligence. In a
separate action the driver of Car Two sought property and personal
between 'slight' and 'none' is imperceptible" under any ordinary definition of
"slight." It further argues, 67 Wash. Dec. 2d at 330-31, 407 P2d at 806, that:
[W]hile at first blush it would seem that the majority have conjured up a
quantity of care which is less than slight, as the term is ordinarily understood,
I think that the actual and practical effect of the opinion may be simply to
enlarge the concept of "slight". ...
PaossER, TORTS 119-20 (2d ed. 1955).
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injury damages from the host-driver of Car One, alleging the latter's
negligence. The host-driver of Car One counterclaimed for property
damage, alleging negligence on the part of the driver of Car Two.
Since the three claims arose from the same accident, the two actions
were consolidated, over the objection of plaintiff, and tried to a single
jury. The verdict in the action between the two drivers was that
neither driver was entitled to recover against the other. In the wrongful death action the jury rendered its verdict in favor of the driver of
Car Two. The trial judge, though aware that the verdicts seemed
inconsistent, denied plaintiff's request for submission of special interrogatories to the jury to explain the apparent inconsistency, sustaining the driver of Car Two's objection to such inquiry. Plaintiff
alone appealed, contending, inter alia, that the verdicts were inconsistent because the jury, in not finding in favor of either driver in
their action against each other, must necessarily have found both
drivers to have been negligent, and that, since the negligence of the
host-driver cannot be imputed to the guest-passenger,1 plaintiff was entitled to recover against the necessarily negligent driver of Car Two.
In an en banc opinion, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed. Held: After verdicts have been rendered in actions consolidated for
trial, special interrogatories may not be submitted to the jury to explain an apparent inconsistency when the pleadings, evidence, and
instructions of the court support a possible finding that the verdicts
are consistent. Hawley v. Mellem, 66 Wash. Dec. 2d 753, 405 P.2d
243 (1965).
Separate claims may be consolidated for trial at the discretion of
the trial judge.' Authority is split on the effect of verdicts rendered by
the same jury in consolidated cases. Some jurisdictions treat the
verdicts as being rendered by separate juries, since that would have
been the result if the cases had not been consolidated for trial; under
this view, there is no requirement that the verdicts be consistent.4
The other view is to recognize that separate verdicts rendered in consolidated cases are, in fact, rendered by the same jury and therefore
must be consistent because the same jurors are reaching verdicts by
'Knight v. Borgan, 52 Wn. 2d 219, 324 P.2d 797 (1958) ; Winston v. Bacon, 8 Wn.
2d 216, 111 P.2d 764 (1941) ; Allen v. Walla Walla Valley Ry. Co., 96 Wash. 397, 165
Pac. 99 (1917).
'The vote for affirmance was 6-3.
'Sage v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 62 Wn. 2d 6, 380 P.2d 856 (1963) ; State ex rel
Sperry v. Superior Court, 41 Wn. 2d 670, 251 P.2d 164 (1952) ; State ex rel. Shaffer
v. Superior Court, 184 Wash. 316, 50 P.2d 917 (1935).
'See, e.g., Aragon v. Kasulka, 68 N.M. 310, 361 P.2d 719 (1961), and cases cited
therein.
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evaluating the same evidence.5 The Washington court has expressed
its preference for the more realistic approach that verdicts rendered
in consolidated cases tried before the same jury must be consistent.0
The rendering of inconsistent verdicts is sufficient ground on which
to base the granting of a new trial, the theory being that one or the
other of the parties did not receive a fair trial.7
The court in the principal case met plaintiff's argument-that the
driver of Car Two must necessarily have been negligent-by hypothesizing that the jury may have found that neither driver proved the
other's negligence by a fair preponderance of the evidence, such being
the burden of proof on the party asserting negligence.' In other words,
the court speculated that the evidence of negligence in the action
between the two drivers was found by the jury to be equally balanced.'
If such explanation be attached to the jury's verdict denying recovery
to either driver, then the verdict in favor of the driver of Car Two
in plaintiff's wrongful death action was not inconsistent, since under
the court's reasoning the negligence of the driver of Car Two was
never established. The court invoked the rule that the jury's verdict
will not be disturbed on appeal if it is supported by substantial evidence. 10 To support this position, the court cited evidence in the
record which tended to prove that the driver of Car Two was not
negligent."
See, e.g., Detrixhe v. McQuigg, 316 P2d 617 (Okla. 1957).
'Mitchell v. Rice, 183 Wash. 402, 48 P.2d 949 (1935); Maddock v. McNiven,
139 Wash. 412, 247 Pac. 467 (1926).
'Ibid. That a party did not receive a fair trial is a ground for new- trial under
WAs H. R. PLEAD., PRAc., PRoc. 59.04W(1). See also note 18 infra.

'Wilson v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 44 Wn. 2d 122, 265 P.2d 815 (1954) ; Hutton
v. Martin, 41 Wn. 2d 780, 252 P.2d 581 (1953).
'It should be noted that the jury was instructed, 66 Wash. Dec. 2d at 760, 405 P.2d
at 247:
If the evidence is equally balanced on the issues of negligence or proximate
cause so that it does not preponderate in favor of the party making the charge,
then he or she has failed to fulfill his burden of proof, and your finding must be
against the party making such charge.
But see text accompanying note 14 infra.
'0 Allen v. Fish, 64 Wn. 2d 665, 393 P.2d 621 (1964).
The court found the following evidence to be substantial, so as to invoke the
rule:
Two witnesses testified that they were following [Car One] as it proceeded west
on Second Avenue, and that the signal light was red when [the driver of Car
One] entered the intersection. They also testified that [the driver of Car One]
did not slow down when he entered the intersection. [The driver of Car Two]
testified that he entered the intersection on a green light. Another witness, who
was following [Car Two], testified that [the driver of Car Two] entered the
intersection on either a green or an amber light.
66 Wash. Dec. 2d at 760, 405 P.2d at 248. The question raised, of course, is why the
jury denied recovery to the driver of Car Two in his action against the driver of
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In a strong dissent, Judge Hamilton reached the "inescapable"' 2 conclusion that one or both drivers must have been negligent, because
"the evidence indisputably establishes the collision involved occurred
within the controlled intersection, that one of the drivers entered the
intersection against a red light, and that neither driver saw the other
until the instant before or at impact."' 3 It was Judge Hamilton's
opinion that the verdicts were indeed inconsistent, and he urged that a
"a jury should not be permitted to abdicate its responsibility of deciding the issues involved upon the basis that the evidence was 'equally
balanced.' ""s
The reasoning of the majority in reaching the conclusion that the
verdicts were consistent is not convincing. As brought out in the
dissent, the physical circumstances surrounding the collision compel a
conclusion that negligence of one or both drivers was the proximate
cause of the collision. There was no evidence that the traffic control
signal was not functioning properly. Each driver approached and
entered the intersection without stopping.' 5 The cycle of a traffic signal is such that the color red always faces one direction or the other.
In order for a collision to have occurred midway in the intersection,
it would seem clear that one of the drivers must have entered the
intersection against a red light. 6 Thus, in the action between the
two drivers, the issue of negligence on the part of one or both 17 drivers
was clearly before the jury. Yet the court reached the improbable
conclusion that the jury found the evidence of negligence between
the drivers to be equally balanced. The court, perhaps unwittingly,
is condoning a practice which would permit jurors to avoid deciding
difficult issues, and is allowing such a shirking of responsibility to
stand as the basis for a final judgment. 8
Car One. Since the driver of Car Two was a party to the appeal only as respondent,
having elected not to cross-appeal, the court was not called upon to decide whether
he was entitled to a new trial on his claim against the driver of Car One.
66 Wash. Dec. 2d at 763, 405 P.2d at 249.
'3 Ibid.
14

Ibid.

" 66 Wash. Dec. 2d at 755, 405 P.2d at 244.
" Ordinarily the driver of an automobile who is confronted by a red traffic light
at an intersection must stop, and one who enters an intersection against a red light
may be guilty of negligence, gross negligence, or negligence per se. 3 BLASHFIELD,
AUTOMOBME LAW AND PRAcTIcE 102 (3d ed. 1965).
1' The driver who entered the intersection facing the green light could also have
been negligent. See Lanegan v. Crauford, 49 Wn. 2d 562, 304 P.2d 953 (1956).
" Whether failure to decide issues fairly presented is an irregularity in the proceedings of the jury, a ground for new trial under WASH. R. PLEAD., PRAC., PROC.
59.04W(1), or misconduct under Rule 59.04W(2), is a question which has not been
considered by the Washington court. Arguably such failure might also be a substantial failure of justice under Rule 59.041V(9). Various problems are inherent, how-
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The meaning of the jury's seemingly inconsistent verdicts in the
principal case need not have been left to interpretation by hypothesis
or speculation. The question could have been resolved at the trial
if the jury had been allowed to explain the meaning of its verdicts
in response to special interrogatories. Yet the court held "special
interrogatories to explain a verdict are improper,"1 9 citing as authority
Coleman v. George,2 ° and Gardner v. Malone.2 1 It is doubtful that
these cases support the court's proposition. In Coleman, the issue to
be decided was whether affidavits of jurors revealing the manner of
the jurors' deliberations could be admitted as evidence of juror misconduct, a ground for new trial." The court there held that the
affidavits were inadmissible because they divulged what considerations
entered into a juror's deliberations or controlled his actions in arriving
at the verdict, citing Gardner as authority. In Gardner, the court
set forth the rule that affidavits of jurors' misconduct tending to show
the fact of misconduct were admissible, but affidavits were not admissible which tended to show the effects of misconduct, i.e., how
the facts operated to influence the jurors' decision, it being the province of the trial judge to determine such effects. Coleman and Gardner support the proposition that motives behind a verdict may not
be made the subject of inquiry, but those cases should not be read
as authority that any inquiry to explain a verdict is improper. Plaintiff
in the principal case requested the trial court to interrogate the jury
as to the intent of its verdicts,2 3 not as to the jury's motive in reaching
the verdicts. That the trial court could make such inquiry is not
without precedent.2 4 The court in the principal case failed to distinguish between the question posed to the jury, "Why did you decide,"
which would be improper under the Gardner test, and the question,
"What did you decide," which would not be prohibited by the rule.
The trial court denied plaintiff's request for special interrogatories,
ever, in the use of this argument as a ground for a new trial. See Trautman, New

Trials for Failure of Substantial Justice, 37 WAsEE. L. REv. 367 (1962).
a'
66 Vash. Dec. 2d at 759, 405 P.2d at 247.
: 62 Wn. 2d 840, 384 P.2d 871 (1963).
" 60 Wn. 2d 836, 376 P.2d 651, 379 P.2d 918 (1962), 38 WAsH. L. REv. 339 (1963).
XVASH. R. PLEAD., Prac., Pnoc. 59.04W(2).
' 66 Wash. Dec. 2d at 762, 405 P.2d at 248.
"'See, e.g., Smith v. S. & F. Construction Co., 62 Wn. 2d 479, 481, 383 P.2d 300,
301 (1963), in which it was stated:
A trial court is justified in making such inquiry of jurors as to enable it to
understand their will and intention, and their answers to such inquiry will be
looked upon as an aid in the rendering of a proper judgment.
Cf. Haney v. Cheatham, 8 Wn. 2d 310, 111 P.2d 1003 (1941) (not error for judge to
send jury back to reconsider an inconsistent verdict).
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apparently on the ground that plaintiff waived her right to such interrogatories when she failed to make the request with the judge's instructions to the jury.2' The appellate court reached the same conclusion.2 6 It should be noted, however, that at the time plaintiff had
her opportunity to submit special interrogatories she had no reason
to suspect that the verdicts would be inconsistent. It seems a harsh
result to hold that waiver had occurred, thus, in effect, charging parties
in a consolidated trial with the foresight to anticipate that the jury
will render inconsistent verdicts.
Considering the facts in the principal case-that plaintiff objected
to consolidation in the first instance and that the trial judge recognized
and pointed out the inconsistency of the verdicts-it would seem that
the court should have been particularly amenable to any contention
by plaintiff that she did not receive a fair trial. Yet the court, far
from being amenable, appears to have gone out of its way in finding
a basis on which to affirm the judgment against plaintiff. While plaintiff should not be entitled to judgment against the driver of Car Two
on the basis of her contention on appeal (it being equally arguable
that the driver of Car Two should have been awarded recovery against
the driver of Car One), an order for a new trial would have been
appropriate. Certainly the public policy in favor of ending litigation
is far outweighed by the policy that substantial justice should be
rendered in the courts. In the principal case, there is manifest doubt
that justice was done at the trial level. The appellate decision did not
alleviate that doubt.

Before the causes were submitted to the jury, the question of special interrogatories was discussed in chambers, and it was agreed that no special interrogatories would be submitted. Plaintiff took no exception. Brief of Respondents, pp.
35-36.
" 66 Wash. Dec. 2d at 759, 405 P.2d at 247.

